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COMMENTS
Of importance and certain to be raised at the next hearing of this
issue will be the most recent Oregon Supreme Court decision on char-
itable immunity. The Oregon legislature had failed to pass a bill
eliminating charitable immunity, which has also occurred in Penn-
sylvania. In Hungerford v. Portland Sanitarium,4 3 this point was
raised along with the case of Landgraven v. Emanuel Lutheran
Charity Board,4 4 which had relied upon the same reasoning as the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court did in Michael. But the court reiterated
the proposition that courts had evolved the doctrine of tort liability
without legislative aid and where the legislature is equivocal, the
court will act as justice requires. Certainly it can not be emphatically
stated, as the concuring opinion of Justice Bell did in Michael,4 5 that
the failure to pass a particular bill in the legislature implies legisla-
tive agreement with the law as it is.
If the court applies the language in Mathieson, Doyle and Malter
it is inevitable that charitable institutions will be stripped of their
immunity from tort liability. When stare decisis and public policy
are given the same weight in charitable immunity cases as it is in
these other areas, the charitable immunity doctrine will be extinct
in Pennsylvania.
JOHN W. MCGONIGLE
RIGHTS OF SOCIETY VS RIGHTS OF THE INDIVIDUAL
IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL LAW
Since early in the Twentieth Century, the trend in the administration
of criminal law, both in state and federal courts, has been toward in-
creased protection of the rights of the individual. At the same time,
and perhaps as a result thereof, there has been an attendant decrease
in the police powers of federal, state and local law enforcement
agencies.
The vexing problem posed by this shift in emphasis from protection
of property rights to the present day atmosphere of strengthened hu-
man rights, is illustrated by the rapidly rising crime rate in the United
States. In 1961, 1,926,090 serious crimes were committed, topping the
43. 384 P.2d 1009 (1963).
44. 203 Ore. 489, 280 P.2d 301 (1955).
45. Supra note 2. (concurring opinion of Bell. J.).
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all time high record of the previous year by 3%.1 In 1962, 2,048,370
serious crimes were reported, a 6% rise over 1961.2 In 1963,
2,259,100 serious crimes were committed, representing a 10% rise
over 1962. 3 From 1958 through 1963, the number of criminal
offenses has increased five times faster than the growth of population
has in the same period. 4 In the decade from 1950 to 1960, the Ameri-
can crime rate increased 98% while the population increased 18%.-
Although statistics for 1964 are not yet available, indications are
that the spiraling crime rate will set another record and will again
far exceed the population growth.
The mere recital of the above statistics does not, in and of itself,
begin to tell the story of today's anti-law enforcement climate. A
by-product of the apparent contempt for authority in any form is the
abnormally high number of assults on law enforcement officers. In
1963, there were 16,793 assaults on police Qfficers. 6 Eighty-eight
police officers were killed in the line of duty.7 This wholesale disorder,
reflected by the above figures, has brought about a natural and deep
concern from some of our nation's leading law enforcement officers.
Generally, they feel that today's criminal is overprotected by the
courts, which results in a lessening of security for his potential
victims.
Robert V. Murray, Chief of Police, Washington, D. C., feels that
his police officers are continually being frustrated by court decisions
that narrow the scope of police power and give the offender greater
latitude.8 Chief Murray maintains statistics that show a steady
decrease in crime in the capital city from 1953 to 1957 and a steady
rise thereafter. 9 In 1957, the Mallory v. United States decision1 0 was
handed down by the United States Supreme Court. In Mallory,1
the Court ruled that police officers must not unduly question a suspect
before he is given a preliminary hearing before a magistrate.
1. Uniform Crime Reports for the United States-1961, p. 1.
2. Uniform Crime Reports for the United States-1962 p. 1.
3. Uniform Crime Reports for the United States-1963, p. 2.
4. Ibid.
5. Pennsylvania Law Enforcement Journal, Sept. 1964, p. 61.
6. Uniform Crime Reports, Supra note 3 at p. 133.
7. Id. at p. 132.
8. Knebel, Washington, D. C.-Portrait of a Sick City, Look, June 4,
1963, p. 15, at p. 19.
9. Ibid.
10. 354 U.S. 449 (1957).
11. Ibid.
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William H. Parker, Chief of Police, Los Angeles, California, has
commented:
It is the guilty criminal who profits when he is given his
freedom on a technicality, and it is the innocent victims of
his future crimes who lose. The criminal prosecution pits the
people of the state, and not the police, in opposition to the
criminal. I fail to see how the guilty criminal freed consti-
tutes a personal loss to the police officer who has merely at-
tempted to bring a criminal to justice. 1 2
J. Edgar Hoover, Directer, Federal Bureau of Investigation, in a
discussion involving the increased criminal activity, stated:
It is difficult to follow the reasoning of some authorities who
seem bent on changing our whole judicial structure to mollify
the criminal element. Disinterested prosecutors and overly
protective courts tilt the scales of justice in favor of the
lawless.... The administration of justice goes hand in hand
with the fight against criminality. We shall see no abatement
in the scourge of lawlessness as long as "soft justice" is the
vogue. Our legal machinery in some areas has long since
departed from its primary purpose - the protection of
society. 13
The opinions evidenced above are not alone shared by law en-
forcement officers. Indicative of the opinions of some of the promi-
nent jurists in the country is a recent newspaper article 1 4 in which
Chief Justice Bell, Pennsylvania Supreme Court, said that the City
of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, was beset by daily muggings, knif-
ings, robberies and murders. In addition, Chief Justice Bell stated:
It is getting so that citizens are afraid to leave their homes
after dark .... Disrespect for law and order, juvenile crimes
and other violent crimes have reached epidemic propor-
tions .... 1 5
He criticized gullible parole officers, weak parents, lenient parole
board members and most important, unrealistic judges, as being
responsible for the apparent lawlessness.' 1
12. Pennsylvania Law Enforcement Journal, Supra note 5 at p. 33.
13. FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, April 1962, p. 1.
14. Pittsburgh Post Gazette, May 8, 1964, p. 7, col. 1.
16. Ibid.
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Associate Judge Scileppi of the New York Court of Appeals, in
a recent address, 1 7 displayed personal concern with the expansion
of concepts dealing with constitutional rights which he thinks has
brought about an imbalance in the area of criminal law. He stated
that society has a right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness
and that these rights should be protected along with the protection
of the criminal's individual rights. Further, Judge Scileppi stated:
The criminal already has adequate protection as defined by
the Constitution and by court decisions. . . . I think it time
to give some thought to the rights of the decent, law abiding
people who make up the bulk of our society.'s
Chief Judge Lumbard, U. S. Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, in
the keynote address to the National District Attorneys Association,
New York, New York, stated:
.. there has never been a time when our bar and bench were
better trained and more expert in civil matters.
Yet never has there been a time when the level of profes-
sional effort in the criminal courts was at a lower ebb.' 9
Further Chief Judge Lumbard charged that although people today
are more jealous of their civil rights than ever before, they have
never seemed to be less mindful of their obligations as citizens. They
appear to be unwilling to abide by the law.2 0
Viewed realistically, we are faced with the fact that in the United
States today, the average citizen is in greater danger than ever before
of becoming a victim of criminal onslaught. It means that the basic
right of personal security is steadily diminishing.
Although it is rather generally acknowledged that the development
of the law concerning human rights was something long needed in
American jurisprudence, we should at the same time keep in mind
the considerations of society. The goal in the enforcement of the
criminal law should be equal and just treatment for every criminal
suspect. Simultaneously, however, the interests of society should be
adequately protected from the murderer, the sex-deviate, the robber
and the arsonist.
So far, we have not yet achieved the desired equilibrium between
the rights of society and the rights of the individual. The pendulum
17. Address by Associate Judge Scileppi, Judicial Section of the New York
State Bar, Feb. 1, 1964, in FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, May 1964, p. 9.
18. Ibid.
19. Philadelphia Evening Bulletin, Aug. 19, 1964, p. 38, col. 1.
20. Ibid.
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has swung from favoring property rights to favoring individual
rights. While few will doubt that this is the right direction in which
to proceed, there is justifiable concern among many that the shift has
been too great; that in emphasizing the need for protection of the
criminal's human rights we may have lost sight of the need for the
safety and security of the average law abiding citizen; that a serious
effort to bring about a balancing of society's rights and individual
rights is sorely needed.
The existing imbalance has been brought about by the failure of
the legislative and executive branches of government to keep pace
with an extremely liberal minded Supreme Court.
The United States Supreme Court has been the prime mover in
the advancement of human rights in the area of criminal law. In a
two-pronged attack on deprivations of human rights, the Court has
consistently applied the sanction of the fourth amendment and federal
exclusionary rules of evidence upon federal law enforcement agen-
cies 2 ' and applied the fourteenth amendment to violations by state
and local law enforcement officers. 2 2 State courts, although perhaps
21. See e.g., Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), (Safeguards
of fourth amendment against unreasonable search and seizure directed at federal
officers and federal agencies, not state officers.); Gouled v. United States, 255
U.S. 298 (1921), (Unreasonable search and seizure does not necessarily involve
the employment of force and coercion.); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United
States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920), (Fourth amendment protects against compulsory
production of papers when information upon which subpoenas were framed was
derived by the Government through a previous unconstitutional search and
seizure.); Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313 (1921), (Act of a man's wife
in allowing federal officers to enter his home without a search warrant is not
a waiver of his constitutional privilege against unreasonable search and seizure.);
McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943), (Confession not admissible whien
obtained after defendant had been detained an unreasonable time. This is due
not because of Constitutional safeguards but because of federal rules of proce-
dure.); Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959), (Probable cause to arrest,
search and seize must consist of more than mere suspicion, although clear evi-
dence of guilt is not required either.); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206
(1959), (Evidence obtained by state officers and introduced in federal court is
not admissible where the search would have violated federal standards, even
where no federal officers were present during search.); Rios v. United States,
364 U.S. 253 (1960), (State officers' conduct in searching and seizing contraband
must be judged by federal standards even where the search was of a mobile
vehicle.); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961), ("Spike" microphone
inserted into wall constitutes an unlawful and unauthorized physical penetration
of one's premises.).
22. See e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), (All evidence obtained
by search and seizure in violation of the federal constitution is inadmissible
in a criminal trial in a state court.); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952),
(Emetic forced into a defendant's stomach against his will, to obtain evidence,
constitutes a violation of the Due Process clause of the fourteenth amendment.);
1964)
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not as zealous as the Supreme Court, have followed the lead of the
Supreme Court. 2 3
Some of the latest examples of Supreme Court reversals of lower
court convictions are Massiah v. United States2 4 and Escobedo v.
Illinois. 25
In Massiah, the defendant had retained legal counsel and was free
on bond when federal agents, without the defendant's consent, secured
a confederate's permission to install a listening device in an automobile
in which Massiah and the confederate would be riding. The agents
later testified as to what was heard via the "bug." The Supreme
Court held that such statements, deliberately elicited without the
aid of defendant's attorney, violated the sixth amendment and could
not be used.
In Escobedo, police officers investigating a murder prevented the
defendant and defendant's counsel from seeing each other even
though they were in the same office and each had requested to see
each other. It was not until after Escobedo had confessed that he
was permitted to see his attorney. The Court held that when the
purpose of the questioning is to elicit a confession and the accused
states that he wishes to consult with his previously retained attorney,
the fourteenth amendment requires exclusion of subsequently obtained
confessions. The basis of the Escobedo decision was denial of legal
counsel plus an absence of a warning against making incriminating
statements.
The Escobedo decision, which has had law enforcement officers
wondering just what their powers were in regard to questioning sus-
Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199 (1960), (Confession that is not the product
of one's own volition is a violation of the Due Process clause of the fourteenth
amendment.); Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961), (A coerced confession
may be one where no brutality is exercised.).
23. See e.g., People v. Cahan, 44 Cal.2d 434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955), (Forced
entry to secrete microphones constitutes unreasonable search and seizure as to
everything overheard.); Rickards v. State, 45 Del. 573, 77 A.2d 199 (1950),
(Arrest without warrant on belief only held invalid.); Byrd v. State, 80 So.2d
694 (Sup. ct. Florida) (1955), (Evidence will be suppressed prior to trial where
obtained by unlawful search and seizure.); People v. Castree, 311 Ill. 392, 143
N.E. 112 (1924), (A search of premises not accurately described in a search
warrant Is unreasonable.); Johnson v. Commonwealth, 296 S.W.2d 210, (Ct.
App. Ky.) (1956), (Entry with arrest warrant for one does no validate arrest
of another after finding contraband.); State v. Pachesa, 102 W.Va. 607, 135 S.E.
908 (1926), (Delay of 50 days from time of issuance of search warrant to its
execution invalidates the search.).
24. 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
25. 84 Sup. Ct. 1758 (1964).
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pects, has already been interpreted. In Jackson v. United States, 26
defendant was arrested in New York on a federal warrant charging
him with felony-murder in the District of Columbia. The arresting
officers immediately advised him of his rights involving self-incrimina-
tion and that he was entitled to an attorney. Later in the same day,
he was presented before a U. S. Commissioner, who advised him of his
right to legal counsel. The next day two District of Columbia police
officers, acting on a removal warrant, arrived in New York, and in-
formed defendant of his right not to speak. Defendant voluntarily
confessed anyway and the resulting confession was later used by
the prosecution at the trial.
The Court held first that there was no evidence that the confession
had been compelled and noted that there is no requirement that coun-
sel be appointed at the preliminary hearing. It also determined that
neither Massiah nor Escobedo requires the exclusion of otherwise
voluntary confessions made before an accused has expressed any de-
sire for an attorney but after he had been thoroughly advised of his
rights to counsel and to remain silent.
Perhaps the Jackson decision is the start of the balancing process
whereby we will see a strengthening in the protection afforded society.
The challenge to the security of society could be further alleviated,
in part by progressive legislation, and in part by updating antiquated
police systems now in effect in most American cities.
The powers of the police appear to be the most hazily defined in
the procedures used to gather evidence prior to arrest and in disposi-
tion of the prisoner during the period before his initial hearing.
With most criminals and in particular, those professionals engaging
in organized criminal activity of a national scope, there is little hope
of obtaining evidence voluntarily. The thought of self preservation
alone deters criminals from voluntarily parting with evidence that
may eventually lead to their imprisonment. An extremely effective
tool of law enforcement officers, used to compensate for the criminal's
reluctance to voluntarily part with evidence, is the wiretap. Prior to
the enactment of Section 605 of the Federal Communications Act of
1934,27 wiretapping was an accepted form of law enforcement. 2 s
Since the federal wiretap law, however, not only has the federal
26 . ........ F.2d ........ (D.C. Cir. 1964).
27. 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1934) provides in part:
No person not being authorized by the sender shall intercept any
communication and divulge or publish the existence, contents, substance,
purport, effect or meaning of such intercepted communication to any
person.
28. See e.g., Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
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government been deprived of this most helpful tool, but many state
law enforcement agencies have been deprived as well. This is due to
the confusion now existing as to the legality of state wiretaps, when
viewed in conjunction with the federal prohibition. 29
One of the reasons the present situation regarding wiretapping
is distasteful is that the existing federal law does not really guarantee
privacy. Under the current law, anyone can listen in without violating
the federal statute. To convict someone of a violation of the statute,
both the wiretap and an unlawful disclosure must be proven. 3 0
Former Attorney General Kennedy's proposed wiretap legislation 3 1
should solve most, if not all, of the problems now existing in the wire-
tap controversy. The legislation includes a prohibition against wire-
tapping except for certain enumerated crimes. These crimes would be
limited to those involving national security, human life, trafficking in
narcotics, and interstate racketeering. Any other unauthorized inter-
ception would be punishable with two years imprisonment and a
$10,000.00 fine.
Other provisions of the proposed legislation are:
Wiretapping would be authorized only by court order. The right to
apply would be limited to only the top law enforcement officers of any
particular agency within a given area. The procedural methods would
be handled in a similar way to the present method of obtaining search
warrants. The taps would be good only for a prescribed period of time.
Applications for the wiretaps would be handled secretly. Uniform
rules for both federal and local law enforcement officers would be
established.
The former Attorney General's proposal should help maintain
national security, stamp out organized crime and put an end to present
violations of law by law enforcement officers and private individuals. 3 2
29. In Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199 (1952), the Supreme Court held
that § 605 of the Federal Communications Act did not prohibit state courts from
allowing the use of evidence obtained through a wiretap, whereas in Benanti v.
United States, 355 U.S. 96 (1957), the Court held that wiretap evidence obtained
by state officers in pursuance of a state order was inadmissible in a federal court.
30. Kennedy, Attorney General's Opinion on Wiretaps, The New York
Times Magazine, June 3, 1962, p. 21, at p. 80. This is however a debatable issue
since the Supreme Court in Rathbun v. United States, 335 U.S. 107, 108 (1957)
specifically stated that they were not, in that case, deciding the question of
whether interception without divulgence was a violation of § 605 of the Federal
Communications Act.
31. See HR 10185, 87th Congress, 2nd Session (1962).
32. Although § 605 of the Federal Communications Act was designed to
stop wiretapping, it is reliably reported that wiretapping by both police officers
and private citizens is practiced extensively throughout the United States.
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The proposed legislation should also include provisions for the
regulation of electronic eavesdropping. Presently there is no statu-
tory regulation in this field and the Supreme Court has declined to
hold that such eavesdropping, unaccompanied by an unauthorized
physical invasion, is a violation under the Constitution. 3 3
If electronic eavesdropping is not included in the legislation, the
temptation to bypass the legal requirement of obtaining a wiretap
order and "eavesdrop" instead, would be great. On occasions where an
officer did not have probable cause to obtain the order, he could then,
without fear of recrimination, resort to eavesdropping and the in-
dividual's right to privacy would be lost.
It is not intended, by this comment, to limit the scope of needed
legislative enactments to just the above mentioned wiretap proposal.
Illustrative of other needed forms of legislation are tighter federal,
state and local laws covering registration, possession and transporta-
tion of firearms, stricter control over the interstate, and intrastate
movements of felons, acceptance of lie-detector data as evidence in
court and stricter minimum penalties for certain type offenses such
as assaults upon law enforcement officers.
In addition to needed legislative enactments, a sample of which is
the above mentioned wiretap law, there is a need for better trained and
better educated state and local police officers.
The police officer who is actively engaged in the investigation and
detection of crime should be highly trained so that he knows what
is and what is not permissible to insure both a safeguard of individual
rights and a high percentage of successful investigations. He should
know when he may and when he may not search and seize contra-
band; when, how long, and under what circumstances he may question
a suspect and how long he may detain him before giving him a pre-
liminary hearing.
Today's law enforcement officer should be thoroughly schooled and
trained in the law of arrest, search and seizure and related matters.
Placing a new police officer on active duty today with relatively the
same training he would have received twenty-five years ago merely
fosters today's anti-law enforcement atmosphere. Today's officer not
only must receive extensive schooling and on-the-job training at the
inception of his career but must be constantly kept current of changes
or trends in the criminal law.
Hennings, The Wiretapping-Eavesdropping Problem: A Legislator's View, 44
Minn. L. Rev. 813, 821 (1960).
33. See e.g., On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952); Goldman v.
United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963).
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To effectively recruit and retain top personnel who would be capable
of assimilating and using the type of training required, most munic-
ipalities will find it necessary to update their pay scales. In a recent
article discussing today's crime costs, Federal Bureau of Investigation
Director Hoover stated:
The entrance salary for patrolmen in some of our cities hav-
ing more than 500,000 population is barely $90 per week ....
The average monthly earnings of full-time police employees
in local governments are about $483. This compares with
$508 for firemen, $512 for public utilities workers, $555 for
schoolteachers, and $560 for public transit employees. These
figures lend credence to the contention that our society de-
mands more for less from the law enforcement officer than
from any other public servant. 3 4
In addition to a revised pay scale to attract outstanding personnel,
today's police department must be adequately equipped with the
latest scientific detection devices to use in combatting the modern
criminal.
Law enforcement officers should also be completely free of political
interference in order to provide an indiscriminate measure of protec-
tion for all citizens.
It is in these catagories of employee selection, pay, training, educa-
tion, and, modern equipment where an up to date executive branch
of local government would do its part to bring about relief from
criminal violence.
If the police officer is well versed in the proper investigatory pro-
cedures and has the latest equipment with which to proceed, there
should be relativly few instances where a criminal is allowed to go
free because of a policeman's error. At the same time there should
likewise be fewer instances where police officers, bent on apprehen-
sions regardless of cost, infringe upon individual rights that are
guaranteed by the Constitution.
The protection of the rights and privileges of the individual in this
country is of the highest importance to our democratic system of
government. The United States Supreme Court has led the way in
securing these rights for the individual. With a progressive minded
legislature and well trained and educated law enforcement officers, we
can assure protection for society as a whole and still guarantee that
constitutional safeguards will not be cast aside.
CARMEN R. DAMIAN
34. FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, Sept. 1964, p. 2.
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